



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

## THE MONROE DECLARATION.

---

IN every conflict of European with American interest on the two Western continents, our countrymen make their appeal to the Monroe Doctrine. It is quoted as the supreme, indisputable, and irreversible judgment of our national Union. Among the very few maxims which serve to guide public opinion in our country, this ranks as the chief. Aside from the traditions which preserve our neutrality in foreign wars and complications, and extend equality of commercial advantages to all friendly nations in their intercourse with us, it may be said to indicate the only established idea of foreign policy which has a permanent influence upon our national administration. It has also taken fast hold on the popular mind. A President of the United States, justly appealing to it in an emergency, could not fail of unanimous following of patriotic citizens, even in presence of a consequently impending war. It touches the instinct of national safety, and of pride in our national institutions. A sagacious observer of public opinion will not fail to mark how a simple appeal to this "doctrine," in a given case, holds the general judgment in suspense until it is clear whether its principles are involved. If that question is affirmatively solved, the judgment becomes resolute and unchangeable.

In presence of this powerful sentiment, swaying a great people as well as their government, it is not surprising that the application of the declaration often comes into discussion on the floor of Congress and in the press. It becomes more and more important that it should be understood, in respect to its origin and purpose. When legitimately directed, Europe can never complain of surprise or wrong, for her governments have had nearly sixty years of notice of it from the United States. Indeed, its origin partially, and its occasion wholly, were in Europe. While it has

never received legislative sanction at Washington, this is in no degree to be attributed to failure of approval. It has been the natural consequence of a desire, on the part of Congress, to refrain from committing itself—in an academical sense, merely—to a general declaration. They preferred to leave the initiative of its application, in any complication of circumstances, to the executive organ constitutionally charged with the conduct of foreign correspondence, while themselves retained their constitutional function of enforcing it, in their ultimate discretion, by a declaration of war.

The registered birth of the doctrine was in December, 1823. But it had both an international and national period of gestation, the history of which is full of interest. Our Government was extremely fortunate in having at that time for Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, and for its envoy in London, Richard Rush, of Pennsylvania. The former had not only the advantage of early experience with his father in Europe, but had represented this country in the Netherlands, Portugal, Prussia, Russia, at the Treaty of Ghent, and finally at London. He was thus thoroughly informed of the ways of European diplomacy, and of the spirit of the European powers. To this knowledge he added the firm will and resolute patriotism which have long characterized that distinguished family. Mr. Rush, as his agent at the court of St. James, joined to superior scholarly attainments the agreeable manners which win friendship, the truthful qualities which win confidence, and the careful precision in action which saves governments from difficulties and chiefs from annoyance. Mr. Gallatin was our envoy accredited at Paris, but was, during this period, on leave, and in the United States. Mr. Middleton was the minister of the United States at St. Petersburg, where the discussion of the principle was also in part conducted.

The situation in Europe was uneasy, and among its Western nations were some anger and a growing jealousy. The Eastern members of the "Holy Alliance" were haughtily confident, having autocratic Russia at their head and subjugated France at their feet. One Bourbon had been enthroned at Paris by foreign arms, and another, at Madrid, had replaced a Bonaparte. When the latter came to that throne, with the Spanish people rebellious, the Spanish-American colonies had revolted; and, on the restoration of the Bourbon monarch, had resolved to maintain their separa-

tion, with independent governments. In 1822, our Government, on full consideration, recognized their independence, and resolved thenceforth to use its entire influence to secure the recognition of the new states by Europe. Spain, during the Napoleonic confusion, had tasted the sweets of a more liberal national life; and the Cortes had imposed on Ferdinand VII., after his restoration, a constitution derived from popular right, and inconsistent with the divine right of kings. The royalists, inspired by the French Government, created an insurrection in behalf of the Bourbon principle; but they were defeated. The successful introduction of popular right into Spain was rebellion against the principle of the Holy Alliance. The three great Eastern powers withdrew their ministers from the government controlled by the Cortes, and left to the French monarch the wretched distinction of restoring absolutism to the throne of Spain. On the 28th of January, 1823, he announced, in his speech from the throne to the French Chambers, that he had ordered the recall of his minister at Madrid, and that a "hundred thousand French troops were ready to march to preserve the throne of Spain to a descendant of Henry IV., to preserve this noble kingdom from its ruin, and to reconcile it to Europe." He further declared that "Ferdinand VII. should be free to give to his people the institutions which they can only hold from him, and which, while assuring their repose, would dissipate the just disquiet of France."

Here was the bold annunciation of that claim of the Holy Alliance to the divine right of monarchy, and to interference against free governments, which was the occasion of serious alarm to the American Cabinet, and to which portions of the message of Mr. Monroe were a response. This despotic principle extended equally to Spanish subjects in Spain and in America. It might at any time be claimed to extend to the suppression of this republic, as deriving its constitution from an unlawful authority,—from a rebellious people,—and as furnishing an example which caused disquiet to lawful monarchies.

By August, 1823, the French troops had gained control of so much of Spain as indicated the final success of the purposes of the Holy Alliance and the military triumph of France. Already was the question raised in the English Foreign Office what would be the next step of Spain and of France, and whether the Holy Alliance itself would not proceed to the reclamation of Spanish America. England, by the abolition of the old Span-

ish colonial restrictions on trade, had already opened a large and profitable commerce with Spanish America. This would be lost if there should be a restoration of colonial dependence. This, therefore, was not to be desired. On the other hand, England was the greatest proprietor of dependent colonies on the globe. It was not for her Government to assume the attitude of encouragement to colonial revolt, or of premature recognition of the independence arising from it. But, if not recognized, would not France join her army and navy to the forces of Ferdinand, and so restore European control over the Spanish domains in America? In that case, would not France demand and receive large compensation in territory and colonial dependence, and in commercial intercourse, for her expenditures in the Peninsula and beyond seas? And so would appear on the American scene a contestant more vigorous and more formidable than Spain—a more dangerous rival in both commercial and military affairs. These were anxious questions with the English Cabinet in the summer of 1823, when Mr. Canning, as English Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the 16th of August, in conversation with Mr. Rush, opened the inquiry whether the United States would not join England in the policy of disclaiming all intention of appropriating to themselves any portion of the Spanish possessions in America; of regarding the question of their independence as practically settled; and of opposition to the acquisition of any of these possessions by France, either by conquest or by cession. These views of the English Government had been, in part, presented to France in April, through a note addressed by Mr. Canning to the British ambassador at Paris. French successes in Spain appear to have increased the fears of the British Government, and to have inspired their minister with the thought of securing an ally for their protest in the Government of the United States. He believed the moral effect of their concurrent representations, with their large share of maritime power, would be of itself sufficient to prevent the results which were apprehended. He himself believed “that now all America might be considered as lost to Europe, so far as political dependence was concerned.”

On the 20th of August, 1823, Mr. Canning again presented the subject in a private and confidential note to Mr. Rush, evidently carefully worded and offered with an air of great frankness, in which he declares the following points of English policy,

and asks the United States to join with England in making them public in some suitable form. These points are :

*"First.* That we conceive the recovery of the colonies by Spain to be hopeless.

*"Second.* We conceive the question of the recognition of them as independent states to be one of time and circumstances.

*"Third.* We are, however, by no means disposed to throw any impediment in the way of an arrangement between them and the mother country by amicable negotiation.

*"Fourth.* We aim not at the possession of any portion of them ourselves.

*"Fifth.* We could not see any portion of them transferred to any other power with indifference.

"If these opinions and feelings are, as we firmly believe them to be, common to your Government with ours, why should we hesitate mutually to confide them to each other, and to declare them in the face of the world ?"

The manner of bringing the United States to declare itself on point four is worthy of attention. The dispatch of Mr. Rush communicating this "unofficial" note was received by Mr. Adams October 9th. Mr. Rush, in his reply to Mr. Canning, accepts in substance these declarations, choosing his own form of expression, and excluding the second, as the recognition by the United States was already accorded; but disclaims authority from his Government as to the manner of its avowal of the principles and sentiments involved.

On the 23d of August, 1823, as reported in Mr. Rush's dispatch of August 28 (also received by Mr. Adams October 9), Mr. Canning, by way of urgency, addressed another note to Mr. Rush, in which he advised him of information received that, after the French success in Spain, there was an intention to assemble a congress, or to devise other concerted action upon the affairs of Spanish America. To this note Mr. Rush replied in like spirit as before, always insisting upon the importance of an acknowledgment of the independence of the American States by England, and intimating that he would take great responsibility on himself in following the direction suggested by Mr. Canning, if such acknowledgment should be made at once; and this intention he reported in his dispatch to Mr. Adams.

Under date of 31st of August, Mr. Canning addressed another confidential note to Mr. Rush, who communicated it to the Department with his dispatch of September 8 (received by Mr. Adams November 5), in which he withdraws any official and

decisive character of his former notes, asking that they be treated not as a proposition, but as evidence of the nature of a proposition which he would have desired to make if Mr. Rush had been provided with authority to entertain it.

Mr. Canning again, on the 18th of September (reported by Mr. Rush under date of 19th, and received by Mr. Adams November 3), revived the subject with Mr. Rush at great length and with great urgency; and inquired whether, if England should acknowledge the independence of the Spanish-American States, that would affect Mr. Rush's action upon the declarations proposed to be made. To this Mr. Rush stated frankly that, while he had no specific powers to unite in such declaration, he would in that case stand upon his general powers, and "would put forth with Great Britain the declaration to which he had invited him," and would do so "in the name of his government, and consent to its being promulgated to the world."

On the 26th September, Mr. Canning asked Mr. Rush whether he could not assent to the proposals on a promise by Great Britain of the future acknowledgment of the independence of the South American States. To this Mr. Rush gave a decided refusal.

It appears from Mr. Rush's dispatch of October 10 (received by the State Department November 19) that he was then convinced that the whole effort of Mr. Canning was made in the interests of Great Britain as against France and Russia, and that England had no interest in American independence except so far as it concerned British interests and ambition; and that her government was even in general sympathy with the Holy Alliance in its efforts to suppress popular reforms in Europe. He considers the propositions as abandoned by England, and the discussion as at an end. He awakens to the fact that British policy will be dictated exclusively by British commercial interests, irrespective of colonial or national rights.

Another interview with Mr. Canning on the 24th of November, reported by Mr. Rush under date 26th November, explains the subsequent action of the English Secretary. Coming to no understanding with Mr. Rush, he decided to proceed directly to the French Government for an exchange of views on the subject of Spanish America. And in Mr. Rush's dispatch of December 27, 1823, he communicates to his government the memorandum of the conference between the French ambassador in London,

Prince de Polignac, and Mr. Canning, which was begun October 9 and concluded October 12. On the British side it was declared that the restoration of the colonies to Spain was hopeless, and further war useless. England would continue neutral, but the union of any foreign power with Spain in the attempt to recover the colonies would present a new question on which England would be free to act. The Government disclaimed any desire to appropriate to itself territory or exclusive advantages, and intimated its intention to recognize the new states; and, in presence of any foreign force or menace in the Spanish-American dispute, they would be recognized without delay.

On the part of France it was declared that the claim of Spain was hopeless, that France had no intention or desire to avail itself of the present state of the colonies, or of the relations between France and Spain, to appropriate to herself any part of the Spanish possessions in America, or to obtain exclusive privileges; and that she abjured all intention to act by force of arms against the colonies. France was in favor of a congress of the allies to facilitate reconciliation between Spain and her colonies, and was opposed to any recognition of the new states at present.

Mr. Canning further remarked upon the impropriety of a representative congress discussing Spanish-American affairs "without calling to their counsels a power so eminently interested in the result as the United States of America." To this the Prince avowed himself without instructions, but, personally, saw no insuperable difficulty in such an association. In point of fact, an invitation to a congress of the powers, to be held at Paris, to consider Spanish-American affairs, was issued by the Conde de Ofalia on the part of the Spanish Government, under date of 26th December, 1823.

All these dispatches of Mr. Rush, up to and including that of October 10, which announced the abandonment of the propositions, were received by Mr. Adams prior to November 20, and, of course, in advance of the message of Mr. Monroe.

But it was neither Mr. Rush's dispatches nor Mr. Canning's proposals which first presented the question of principle to the American Government. Mr. Adams possessed not only a trained intellect, inspired by ardent love of our republican institutions, but a perfect acquaintance with the spirit, methods, and tendency of European diplomacy. No man could better appreciate the

menaces to human liberty everywhere, and to all rights of the people, as threatened by the several congresses of the allied powers, and especially by their circular of December 5, 1822, in which the allied monarchs announced their resolution "to repel the maxim of rebellion, in whatever place, or under whatever form, it might show itself." He knew that the unorganized riot of insurrection and the organized riot of despotism were alike destructive of popular liberty. Just now, after the final overthrow of all the Bonapartes, it was the riot of despotism. It was important to keep these despotic powers from our continent, if possible. An ocean between was safer than contiguity of any kind. There were many leagues of little known and much disputed boundary on the north-western coast, claimed by the United States, by England, and by Russia. The Russian minister at Washington wanted to know what instructions our Secretary was going to send to Mr. Middleton. Mr. Adams answered him sturdily, on July 17, 1823, that "we should contest the right of Russia to any territorial establishments in this continent; and that we should assume distinctly the principle that the American continents are no longer subjects for any new European colonial establishments."

Here, already announced to the chief of the Holy Alliance more than four months prior to President Monroe's message, was one branch of the Monroe doctrine. In his message of December following, it took authoritative form as follows: "The American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power."

While Mr. Canning was anxiously observing the dangers which threatened British commercial interests in America from the probable interferences of the allied powers in Spanish-American affairs, and while Mr. Rush was writing his urgent dispatches, the Russian Premier, Count Nesselrode, was dictating certain dispatches to his minister at Washington, Baron Tuyl, touching the same affairs. These dispatches were communicated to Mr. Adams in November, about the time of the arrival of the last dispatches of Mr. Rush on the subject of the Canning proposals. In stating the views of the Czar, Count Nesselrode took occasion to present the political ideas of the allied powers, as well as the Russian view of the Spanish claim to the revolted

American continent. Thus from various sides were concentrating upon Mr. Adams, in the autumn of 1823, notes of the preparation of a conflict which was generally expected, and in which the mailed hand of the Holy Alliance would strike the new continents, and would confront the principles of European despotism with the principles of American liberty, in close and irrepressible combat. The stubborn patriotism of Adams did not for a moment falter. "My purpose would be," he says of himself, "in a moderate and conciliatory manner, but with a firm and determined spirit, to declare our dissent from the principles avowed in those communications, and assert those upon which our Government is founded; and while disclaiming all intention to propagate them by force, and all interference with the affairs of Europe, to declare our expectation and hope that the European powers will equally abstain from the attempt to spread their principles in the American hemisphere, or to subjugate, by force, any part of these continents to their will."

Here again is seen the gestation in Mr. Adams's fertile and resolute mind of the other branch of the Monroe doctrine, and he notes that his "views were approved by the President."

Prior to the 25th November, the Secretary of State had prepared his draft of a reply "intended as a firm, spirited, and yet conciliatory answer to all the communications lately received from the Russian Government, and at the same time an unequivocal answer to the proposals made by Canning to Mr. Rush. It was meant also to be eventually an exposition of the principles of this Government, and a brief development of its political system as henceforth to be maintained: essentially republican—maintaining its own independence, and respecting that of others; essentially pacific—studiously avoiding all involvement in the combinations of European politics, cultivating peace and friendship with the most absolute monarchies, highly appreciating and anxiously desirous of retaining that of the Emperor Alexander; but declaring that, having recognized the independence of the South American states, we could not see with indifference any attempt by European powers, by forcible interposition, either to restore the Spanish dominion on the American continents, or to introduce monarchical principles into those countries, or to transfer any portion of the ancient or present American possessions of Spain to any other European power."

At this time, it appears by a remark of Mr. Adams, the President had already prepared a paragraph of his message relating to this subject, to which his dispatch was to be "conformable." The draft of Mr. Adams was the subject of repeated discussions at the meetings of the Cabinet. President Monroe thought it too strong in its expressions. He was cautious, even timid, from fear of offending the Russian Emperor, and believed it imprudent to state, as Mr. Adams desired, the principles of our republican government in answer to Count Nesselrode's statement of imperial principles. Messrs. Wirt, Calhoun, and Southard took part in the discussions, and Mr. Gallatin was called in for counsel.

Very soon after the reception of the Canning proposals from Mr. Rush, the President had communicated them to the venerable patriot at Monticello for his opinion. Mr. Jefferson had represented his country at Paris and at London, and both as President and as a retired citizen was well advised of the course of European affairs. Nothing had ever shaken his republican faith or his sincere patriotism. Mr. Monroe confided to him the correspondence which contained the germs of such an important feature of American policy, and which possibly involved the independence of the Spanish-American republics, with the fate of liberty itself in the Western Hemisphere. On the 24th October, 1823, Mr. Jefferson, at the age of eighty years, responds with the vigor and vivacity of youth :

"The question presented by the letters you have sent me is the most momentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation since that of Independence. \* \* \*

"Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe. Our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs. \* \* \*

"Great Britain is the nation which can do us the most harm of any one, or all on earth; and with her on our side we need not fear the whole world. With her, then, we should most sedulously cherish a cordial friendship; and nothing would tend more to knit our affections than to be fighting once more, side by side, in the same cause. Not that I would purchase even her amity at the price of taking part in her wars. But the war in which the present proposition might engage us, should that be its consequence, is not her war, but ours. Its object is to introduce and establish the American system, of keeping out of our land all foreign powers—of never permitting those of Europe to intermeddle with the affairs of our nations. It is to maintain our own principle, not to depart from it. And if, to facilitate this, we can effect a division in the body of the European powers, and draw over to our side its

most powerful member, surely we should do it. But I am clearly of Mr. Caning's opinion, that it will prevent instead of provoking war. With Great Britain withdrawn from their scale and shifted into that of our two continents, all Europe combined would not undertake such a war."

After speaking of the question of the United States acquiring some Spanish-American domains, and finding it impracticable, he continues :

"I could honestly, therefore, join in the declaration proposed,—that we aim not at the acquisition of any of those possessions, that we will not stand in the way of any amicable arrangement between them and the mother country; but that we will oppose, with all our means, the forcible interposition of any other power as auxiliary, stipendiary, or under any other form or pretext, and, most especially, their transfer to any power by conquest, cession, or acquisition in any other way."

By desire of the President, Mr. Jefferson transmitted the Rush correspondence to that other experienced statesman of Virginia, Mr. Madison, whose retirement at Montpelier, and his age of seventy-two years, could not prevent patriotic appeals to his wisdom and experience. The junior of Mr. Jefferson by eight years, the response of Mr. Madison indicates a mind by far senior to that of his more vivacious compatriot. His logical mind accepts the situation as portrayed, and sees clearly the necessity "to defeat the meditated crusade" against American independence. Under date of October 30, 1823, he writes to President Monroe :

"It is particularly fortunate that the policy of Great Britain, though guided by calculations different from ours, has presented a coöperation for an object the same with ours. With that coöperation, we have nothing to fear from the rest of Europe, and with it the best assurance of success to our laudable views. There ought not, therefore, to be any backwardness, I think, in meeting her in the way she has proposed; keeping in view, of course, the spirit and forms of the Constitution in every step taken in the road to war, which must be the last step, if those short of war should be without avail."

In a note to Mr. Jefferson, written a few days later, he gives expression to a sentiment which ran as an undercurrent, and still runs as an undercurrent, of all the policy under discussion. He says: "In the great struggle of the epoch between liberty and despotism, we owe it to ourselves to sustain the former—in this hemisphere, at least."

We now see collected before President Monroe, in anticipation of the final form of his famous declarations, the motive forces

and opinions which modified or directed the historical result. Mr. Canning's proposals, sometimes hesitating, sometimes eager, always auxiliary to some unavowed interest of England; Mr. Rush's generous efforts to secure South American independence by British recognition; Russia's bold enunciation of despotic principles and of the right of the Spanish monarch to reclaim his rebellious provinces; Mr. Adams's robust counter-blast, declaring the inalienable rights of the people; the vivacious counsels of Jefferson's liberalism, and the sober advice of Madison's trained and logical wisdom,—all these contributed to shape the other branch of the Monroe declaration, as follows:

“We owe it to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and the allied powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered, and shall not interfere; but with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. . . .

“It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness. . . .

“It is equally impossible that we should behold such interposition in any form with indifference.”

The effect of this declaration in Europe was all that could have been desired by the patriotic statesmen who contributed their counsel to its adoption. The message arrived in England on December 24, 1823, twenty-two days from its delivery to Congress. On the 2d of January, Mr. Canning told Mr. Rush that the principle declared in the message, that the American continents were not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any of the powers of Europe, greatly embarrassed the instructions he was about to send to the British ambassador at St. Petersburg, touching the north-western boundary. He believed that Great Britain would combat this declaration of the President with animation.

Mr. Rush, under date of January 6, 1824, writes:

“All the Spanish-American deputies now in London have waited upon me since its arrival, testifying the high and grateful sense they entertain of

the service which its decisive tone in regard to Spanish-America has rendered to their respective countries."

The Spanish invitation of December 26, for a congress touching her late American possessions, was paralyzed. The whole message, on its arrival in London, excited great attention. "It was upon all tongues; the press was full of it; the Spanish-American deputies were overjoyed; Spanish-American securities rose in the stock-market, and the safety of the new states from all European coercion was considered as no longer doubtful." The document received the approval of the calm judgment of Mr. Madison in April, 1824, in the following terms :

"I never had a doubt that your message, proclaiming the just and lofty sentiments of ten millions, soon to become twenty, enjoying in tranquil freedom the rich fruits of successful revolution, would be received in the present crisis of Europe with exulting sympathies by all such men as Lafayette, and with envenomed alarm by the partisans of despotism. The example of the United States is the true antidote to the doctrines and devices of the Holy Allies; and if continued, as we trust it will be, must regenerate the Old World, if its regeneration be possible."

Its effect upon the then pending negotiations with Russia was so favorable that the convention of 1824 was concluded, in the spring of that year, by the withdrawal on the part of the Emperor of his pretensions to exclusive trade and navigation on the north-west coast, and by fixing the parallel of 54° 40' as the line between the permissible establishments of the respective countries. Between no two governments of the civilized world was the contrast so divergent in all their political principles, traced from their foundation through all their development, as between the United States and Russia. Yet between the American republic and no other country has there been a longer continued or more unbroken friendship. The American diplomatist in Europe is often asked for an explanation of this fact. Perhaps the answer may be found in a remark of the late Czar to a former minister of the United States. Said he: "Your Government and mine are the only logical governments in the world. Either the whole people or one man is entitled to rule." In 1823 the Holy Alliance took the despotic view, and maintained it in Europe. The Government of our country took the popular view, and declared through the President their resolution to maintain it on this hemisphere. Each respected

the sense of right which animated the other, and each has limited itself to its own sphere; and more recently Russia has wholly withdrawn from this continent, with assignment of all her rights to this republic. In due time may all other European governments, by their withdrawal of claims of sovereignty over the Western Hemisphere, manifest their wisdom and their spirit of conciliation toward a people whose fundamental ideas of government present so radical a contrast to those which prevail over the Eastern continents.

JOHN A. KASSON.